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A Landmark Decision | Background Information | Profiles | Related Cases

A Landmark Decision

Roe v. Wade (1973)

Summary of the Case
By Sophie Kim '06

The legal debate over abortion erupted in 1971. Jane Roe, a single, pregnant woman living in Texas, challenged the Texas criminal abortion statutes, which prohibited the practice of procuring or attempting an abortion, except in circumstances where the life of the pregnant woman was threatened. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether women had a constitutional right to an abortion. Justice Harry Blackmun delivered the majority opinion of the Court, stating, the “right of privacy […] is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” The Court held that a woman’s right to an abortion fell within the right to privacy established in the Griswold v. Connecticut decision (1965). The Roe Court also found that this right is “not unqualified,” and must be weighed against important state interests in protecting maternal health and in preserving the fetus from the point of viability until term. The decision granted women autonomy over matters of abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy, and defined increasing levels of state interest for regulating abortion in the second and third trimesters. The Court’s majority opinion set in motion a wave of critical arguments among legal scholars who continue to question and challenge the Court’s landmark decision.

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Background Information

Exploring Constitutional Conflicts: Right to an Abortion?
University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law

Profiles

Norma McCorvey
CNN: Special Reports, "Roe v. Wade"

Sarah Weddington
University of Texas at Austin

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Related Cases

Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 492 U.S. 416 (1983)

Full text
Oyez

Summary of the Case

By Sophie Kim '06

In 1978, the Akron City Council enacted an ordinance establishing a number of provisions to regulate abortions. The ordinance established, in part, that: (1) all second trimester abortions be performed in a hospital rather than an outpatient setting; (2) all pre-abortion counseling be conducted by physicians to ensure informed consent; (3) parents of unmarried minors be informed of, and consent to, their child's abortion; (4) all fetal remains be disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner; and (5) all abortions be subject to a 24-hour waiting period between the time the woman signed a consent form and the time the abortion is performed. The question before the Court in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health was whether the ordinance violated a woman’s right to an abortion as established in Roe, and whether the regulations violated the right to privacy doctrine as determined by the Court and implied in the Fourteenth Amendment.

Here, the Court reiterated its findings in Roe and affirmed its commitment to protecting a woman’s reproductive rights. The Court invalidated the provisions of the Akron ordinance, finding that certain provisions placed significant obstacles in the way of a woman seeking an abortion. Additionally, the Court held that not all minors are necessarily incompetent to make their own abortion decisions and that it was unreasonable for a state to insist that only a physician is competent to provide informed consent information and counseling relevant to informed consent.

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Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)

Full text
University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law

Summary of the Case

By Sophie Kim '06

Planned Parenthood v. Casey challenged the constitutionality of the amended Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, first enacted in 1982. The new provisions at issue required (1) a woman seeking an abortion to give her informed consent, and further specified a 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure; (2) a minor seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of one parent, allowing also a judicial bypass procedure; and (3) a married woman seeking an abortion to provide written documentation indicating that she had notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. A lower court ruling had upheld all the provisions of the amended law, except for the spousal notification requirement.

The Casey Court reaffirmed Roe (1973), but upheld most of the Pennsylvania provisions intended to regulate abortions. The justices reached their decision after assessing the law under a new standard, “the undue burden” standard. This new measure determined the validity of laws restricting abortions by questioning whether a state abortion regulation created a substantial obstacle in the way of a pregnant woman seeking an abortion. The Court held that under this standard, the spousal notification requirement was the only provision that failed the undue burden test.

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Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)

Full text
Oyez

Summary of the Case

By Sophie Kim '06

Following the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade (1973), the Connecticut Welfare Department issued regulations that limited state Medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions to those that were “medically necessary.” An indigent woman who was unable to obtain a physician’s certificate of medical necessity (this would qualify her for public assistance in obtaining an abortion) challenged the validity of the regulations. The question before the Supreme Court in Maher v. Roe was whether the Connecticut law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Court held that the Welfare Department’s regulation created no obstacles for a pregnant woman who wished to have an abortion, nor did it violate the rights of pregnant women as established in Roe. Further, the Maher Court found that the state is under no obligation to pay abortion-related medical expenses for indigent women. The Court concluded that the Connecticut law was rationally related to a legitimate state interest, and thus survived judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.

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Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989)

Full text
FindLaw

Summary of the Case

By Sophie Kim '06

In 1986, the state of Missouri enacted restrictions on the performance of abortions. Health professionals who were state employees and private corporations providing abortion services brought suit in district court, challenging the constitutionality of the Missouri statute. The statute's preamble set forth the belief that life begins at conception, and further provided: (1) that all applicable laws, constitutions and court precedents be extended to the unborn; (2) physicians were to perform viability tests from the twentieth week of pregnancy; (3) public employees and facilities were prohibited from performing or assisting at abortions unless these were necessary to save the pregnant woman’s life; and (4) the use of public funds, employees or facilities for the purpose of encouraging or counseling abortions was unlawful. Lower court rulings affirmed that the provisions of the Missouri statute in question violated the high Court’s decision in Roe (1973). The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ rulings, and held that none of the Missouri law’s provisions were unconstitutional. The question presented before the Court was whether the Missouri statute infringed upon a woman’s right to privacy, or on her rights under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a fractured decision, a deeply divided Court ruled that the statute’s preamble did not present a constitutional question because it had not been applied in any concrete fashion to restrict abortion; the Due Process clause did not require states to enter into the business of abortions; no case or controversy existed in the counseling and encouragement provisions of the law; and the viability testing requirements would be upheld because a state’s interest in protecting potential life superceded any determinations of the point of viability.

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Daphne Francois '06 & Erin Foti '04
Maintained by: Lynne Viti, Senior Lecturer
Department of Writing
Date created: July 1, 2003
Date modified: May 22, 2007
Expires: June 1, 2004