Adele Watkins

Christine Blasey Ford, Anita Hill, Rachel Jeantel, and Amber Heard each testified to having witnessed or experienced violence or harassment at the hands of a man. Despite their informed testimony, each was met with skepticism and disbelief by the public. What might explain the mismatch between the expertise of Ford, Hill, Jeantel, and Heard and the skeptical reception of their reports? We might think that their identities, particularly their gender and race, play some role. In this course, we will investigate how aspects of identity affect how we share and receive knowledge. Particularly, we will explore epistemic harms which uniquely or disproportionately affect marginalized knowers. These topics include epistemic injustice, epistemic exploitation, gaslighting, epistemic oppression, and microaggressions. Questions we will consider include: what is it for a person to be harmed in her capacity as a knower? Can institutions gaslight; can groups be gaslighted? What avenues of epistemic resistance are available to targets of microaggressions, epistemic exploitation, etc.? Are certain epistemic privileges available to marginalized knowers? We will read authors such as Kristie Dotson, José Medina, and Miranda Fricker.

In this course we will explore the philosophical underpinnings and ramifications of the social structures which shape our lives. Among the topics we will consider are racism, gender, disability, and incarceration and prisons. For each topic, we will investigate different accounts of what the phenomenon at issue is. Among the thinkers we will engage are Sally Haslanger, Charles Mills, and Robin Dembroff. Questions for discussion include: What are the implications of endorsing one account of an oppressive structure over another? How are oppressive social structures, e.g. ableism, transphobia, etc., mutually reinforcing? Does oppression manifest differently in different contexts? If so, how? When are the oppressed unduly burdened with explaining or combatting their oppression?

This course will examine some fundamental philosophical questions that arise about death. After comparing differing conceptions of death and differing views about whether we continue to exist after we die, we will consider whether death is bad for the person who dies. We intuitively think that our deaths are bad for us, but, as Lucretius famously points out, most of us do not lament that we were not born sooner. Is it problematic that we tend to hold inconsistent attitudes towards prenatal versus postmortem nonexistence? Is immortality desirable or valuable? How might our thinking about these issues surrounding mortality and immortality inform our thinking about the value of human existence and what makes a life worth living?